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Mine-action Challenges and  
   Responses in Georgia
Following an international conflict in 2008, Georgia faces a greater threat from landmines and explosive 
remnants of war than that posed by previous violence. In response to this threat, Georgia, with  assis-
tance provided by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and the Government of Canada, created national bodies 
to coordinate and implement landmine and ERW clearance. This article documents Georgia’s past ERW, 
landmine and cluster-munitions contamination, as well as efforts to remove these threats.
by Emil M. Hasanov [ iMMAP/ERWCC ] and Petri Nevalainen [ iMMAP ]
Georgia is party to the Conven-tion on the Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines 
and their Destruction (also known at the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention 
or APMBC), and acceded to Protocol V 
on ERW on 22 December 2008 and to 
Amended Protocol II on Landmines on 
8 June 2009.
According to Article 6 of the Geor-
gia Law on International Treaties, inter-
national treaties are an integral part of 
Georgian legislation, and the provisions 
of these treaties establish specific rights 
and obligations that are enacted directly 
without requiring adoption of addition-
al laws or regulations.1
Landmines and ERW in Georgia
The landmine problem in Georgia 
is primarily a result of landmine use 
around former Soviet/Russian military 
bases along international borders and 
from conflicts with the breakaway re-
publics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.2 
Georgia had neither the authority nor the 
responsibility to clear these bases while 
they remained under Russian control. 
However, Russia transferred the last of 
the military bases located in Georgia to 
Georgian authority in November 2007, 
allowing authorities to begin clearance 
operations.3
In addition to landmines, Georgia is 
faced with unexploded cluster submuni-
tions as a result of the conflict between 
Russia and Georgia in August 2008. This 
conflict created a serious threat of ERW 
and cluster-munition injuries to the 
Georgian population at large. The impact 
of this contamination was most notice-
able from the Shida Kartli region north 
of Gori to Tskinvali in South Ossetia. Ad-
ditionally, aerial-delivered bombs and 
missiles that targeted areas in Poti har-
bor, Kopitinari, Batumi (Black Sea coast) 
and around Tbilisi contributed to an in-
creased ERW threat and impact. The in-
creased ERW contamination added to 
prior problems that Georgia faced from 
legacy Soviet/Russian minefields, as well as the existing ERW 
threat in the Abkhazia region.4
Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Mu-
nitions. Georgian officials stated in a letter to the Landmine 
and Cluster Munitions Monitor in April 2010, “The Georgian 
government has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine 
Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munitions Convention, but the 
bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security sit-
uation in the region didn’t allow us to adjoin the mentioned 
conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed 
much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave 
us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conven-
tions until the credible changes occur in the security environ-
ment of the region.”5
Russia used cluster munitions near towns and villages in 
the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor near the South Ossetia admin-
istrative border of Georgia during the August 2008 conflict. 
According to a Human Rights Watch report, Russian clus-
Russian checkpoint.
All graphics courtesy of ERWCC Georgia.
Level of ERW, landmine and cluster-munition contamination in Georgia as of November 2010.
ter-munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians 
and injured 46 during this period.6 As a result, unexploded 
submunitions affected populated and agricultural areas, pos-
ing a threat to the civilian population. Russia produced and 
stockpiled the cluster-munition types used in the August 2008 
conflict (AO-2.5 RTM and 9N210 submunitions, RBK series 
bombs, Uragan rockets and Iskander missiles). Georgia re-
ports possessing RBK-500 bombs, but they are no longer ac-
tive and are slated for destruction.7
Georgia also used cluster munitions, including M85 sub-
munitions in Mk 4 160mm rockets (Georgia procured these 
weapons as packages from Israel) during the August 2008 
conflict.5 Regarding the Human Rights Watch report, the 
Ministry of Defence stated Georgia launched 24 volleys of 
GRADLAR Mk 4 rockets, each volley containing 13 of the 
weapons. While these rockets can have unitary warheads as 
well, assuming all 13 contained cluster munitions would re-
sult in a total of 32,448 M85 submunitions.7
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Currently the threat of ERW, cluster munitions and land-
mines around former military facilities and in some border 
areas outside the South Ossetia borders continues to endan-
ger the civilian population. Furthermore, potentially produc-
tive land is unusable due to the contamination, preventing the 
government from undertaking numerous socioeconomic de-
velopment projects. These projects include agricultural devel-
opment in the Shida Kartli region and tourism expansion on 
the Black Sea and at important religious sites, such as Mskhe-
ta.8 On the other hand, The HALO Trust completed clearance 
of Abkhazia and a ceremony was held on 4 November 2011 to 
acknowledge completion of this project.
Norwegian People’s Aid conducted a General Mine Ac-
tion Assessment funded by the International Trust Fund 
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. Between Octo-
ber 2009 and January 2010 the governments of Hungary and 
the Czech Republic funded this assessment through ITF. The 
GMAA identified eight suspected hazardous areas and seven 
confirmed hazardous areas in 13 districts, the latter of which 
totaled more than an estimated 4.5 square kilometers (1.73 
square miles).
Mine-action Coordination in Georgia 
Immediately following the August 2008 conflict many 
international humanitarian-aid agencies rallied to provide 
emergency response support. Several international organiza-
tions, including the European Union Monitoring Mission, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ITF and the In-
ternational Campaign to Ban Landmines - Georgia, engaged 
in humanitarian mine-action activities in Georgia, but these 
activities lacked coordination. The Georgian Government 
had discussed for several years how to best address the legacy 
landmine issue, but had not until the recent conflict, realized 
the importance of coordinating HMA activities. Two primary 
demining operators were identified: HALO and NPA. HALO 
already operated in Abkhazia, the breakaway autonomous re-
gion of Georgia, and established the Abkhaz Mine Action Of-
fice there in 1999; NPA deployed demining teams in Georgia 
through the end of June 2010.
At the national level, demining capacity was represented 
by Georgia’s Ministry of Defence Brigade of Engineers and by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs Explosive Ordnance Response 
Teams. On 9 October 2008 a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defence and 
the international nongovernmental organization, the Infor-
mation Management & Mine Action Programs.9 PM/WRA 
tasked iMMAP to support the Georgian Government in es-
tablishing the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Cen-
ter to address the ERW problem resulting from the conflict 
and to assist in coordinating clearance of the legacy mine-
fields. Although ERWCC began operations in October 2008, 
the official opening was held on 25 February 2009 in Tbili-
si.10 According to Deputy Defence Minister Giorgi Muchaidze 
who spoke at the launch, “It is more important to reorganize 
the above mentioned office as a national mine action center, 
which would be a step forward for struggling with this prob-
lem.”11 iMMAP and other stakeholders determined through 
an assessment that there was an urgent need to develop local 
capacity for HMA activities, as well as for Georgia to establish 
national HMA standards and technical safety guidelines de-
rived from the International Mine Action Standards.
On 23 October 2008, the Georgian Ministry of Defence 
and the Slovenia-based ITF signed a two-year Memorandum 
of Understanding on HMA assistance. ITF initiated a nation-
al capacity building program in January 2009 that followed 
ERWCC’s general goals. Among other things, the program fo-
cused on providing assistance to national authorities in HMA 
capacity building.12
ERWCC Operations
iMMAP engaged the Ministries of Defence and Inter-
nal Affairs through Memorandum of Understandings and 
worked closely with other Georgian authorities. ERWCC be-
came the Georgian entity tasked to coordinate and execute 
ERW mitigation and is responsible for external quality assur-
ance/quality control of HMA activities (Canada’s Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade initially funded 
QA/QC activities). Through iMMAP’s guidance, the ERWCC 
continued to coordinate HMA activities in Georgia, as well 
as conduct QA/QC and act as the national HMA authority. 
These activities and responsibilities were transferred to the 
Georgian Government in early 2011. During the lifespan of 
the ERWCC, the tasks and responsibilities that were identified 
included the following:13
•	 QA/QC of demining/clearance activities
•	 QA/QC of unexploded ordnance and explosive  
hazard clearance and disposal
•	 Battle-area clearance 
•	 Mine-risk education





The ERWCC hosted regularly scheduled coordination 
meetings with all major HMA stakeholders in Georgia. These 
stakeholders included international NGOs, the Georgian Red 
Cross, the Georgian Ministries of Defence and Interior, and 
the Georgian Army Brigade of Engineers. These meetings 
were held biweekly or as requested by the parties involved 
for the purpose of synchronizing and monitoring HMA ac-
tivities. ERWCC also established mechanisms to assist other 
NGOs and international institutions (United Nations agen-
cies, EU Monitoring Mission, etc.). When suspected con-
tamination is reported and rapid assessments are required, 
clearance plans are made jointly with the appropriate stake-
holders. ERWCC conducted several risk-assessment missions 
during 2010 to survey potential new hazardous areas. An ex-
ample is Perevi village, where the Ministries of Defence and 
Interior requested that the ERWCC conduct an ERW hazard 
assessment after Russian troops withdrew from the village at 
the western border with South Ossetia on 18 October 2010. 
Russian forces in the Perevi area controlled the main road in 
Perevi village, which links nearby South Ossetia villages to the 
rest of the breakaway region. ERWCC found evidence of the 
use of cluster-munitions and other ERW and provided this in-
formation for further action, such as mine risk education, vic-
tim assistance and clearance.
Transition and Georgian Ownership
On 30 December 2010 the Georgian Ministry of Defence 
issued a decree instructing that HMA be included as part of 
a Ministry body known as the State Military Scientific Tech-
nical Center, or DELTA.”14 DELTA has now assumed the 
“…that does not leave us any option other than to stay re-
luctant to join the conventions until the credible changes 
occur in the security environment of the region.”
An ERWCC hazard assessment in Perevi, Georgia.
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HMA coordination role, though exist-
ing ERWCC structure and operations 
are threatened due to lack of funding. 
ERWCC has largely halted operations, 
with the exception of an emergency fol-
low-up clearance operation in Mskheta. 
The organization hopes to resume clear-
ance activities with technical assistance 
from the Azerbaijan National Agen-
cy for Mine Action and funding from 
the Georgian Ministry of Defence and 
NATO.
IMAS and QA/QC training cours-
es were conducted for ERWCC staff 
(mainly the QA/QC section), the Joint 
Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces 
and DELTA, with funding and assis-
tance from PM/WRA. The aim of this 
effort was to increase the level of knowl-
edge regarding HMA and to prepare for 
handover to Georgian ownership. The 
final handover of ERWCC to DELTA oc-
curred in the beginning of 2011. 
Note: This article covers operational 
activities in Georgia until March 2011.
See endnotes page 82
An IMAS training course at ERWCC.
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In Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches, Bercovitch and Jackson create an accessible and well-organized analysis of the best approaches to resolving conflicts in the world today. Emphasizing fundamental changes in the nature of conflict following the Cold War, 
the authors present the argument that conflict resolution must also change. Their analysis characterizes pre-
1991 conflicts as primarily interstate conflicts or power struggles between states and insurgents, overseen 
and manipulated by the major powers. According to the authors, the collapse of the Soviet Union saw “the 
proliferation of ethnic, religious, cultural, and resource-driven conflicts as major threats to international 
peace.” This shift rendered traditional methods of resolving conflicts practically obsolete, forcing innovative 
thinking to produce a new understanding of peace building. 
Bercovitch and Jackson, both from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, describe traditional ap-
proaches—international negotiation, conflict mediation, arbitration and adjudication, U.N. conf lict reso-
lution and peacekeeping—and explain how these methods must evolve to meet the needs of the modern 
world. They analyze new methods—preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, regional task-
sharing, nonofficial justice, and reconciliation—as approaches arising from a philosophy of participatory 
social interaction, which views peace as the result of positive cultural transformation rather than a state im-
posed by a paternalistic superstructure. Additionally, they view nongovernmental organizations as crucial 
actors in implementing this new methodology because of their moral credibility and independence from 
power politics. Concise, well-referenced and eloquent, this book outdistances other weightier tomes in de-
fining a peace-building agenda for the future. 
Reviewed by Cameron Macauley, CISR staff.
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